The State of Utah v. Troy Lynn Schultz : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
The State of Utah v. Troy Lynn Schultz : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda M. Jones, Lisa J. Remal; attorneys for appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Kenneth R.
Updegrove; attorneys for appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Schultz, No. 20010775 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3483
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TROY LYNN SCHULTZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010775-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for arson, a third degree felony offense in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b) and (3)(b) (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. 
Atherton, Judge, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES (5497) 
LISA J. REMAL (2722) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Utah Court of App^a3o 
FEB 1202 
Papist stage 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
TROY LYNN SCHULTZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010775-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for arson, a third degree felony offense in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b) and (3)(b) (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. 
Atherton, Judge, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES (5497) 
LISA J. REMAL (2722) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 2 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
A. CIVILIANS DID NOT WITNESS SCHULTZ OR ANY PERSON 
SET THE VAN ON FIRE. 3 
B. THE OFFICERS PROVIDED TESTIMONY ABOUT THEIR 
OBSERVATIONS. 6 
C. THE "EXPERTS" TESTIFIED TO THE USE OF A FIRE 
"ACCELERANT" TO SUPPORT "INTENT" TO COMMIT ARSON. 7 
1. Jeffrey Long's "Expert" Testimony Concerning the Use of 
Dogs in Detecting Fire Accelerant Was Based in Relevant Part 
on Articles He Read. 7 
2. Rex Nelson Testified to the Use of His Detection Dog, Oscar. 
at the Scene. 11 
3. The Expert from the State Crime Lab Could Not Confirm that 
Accelerant Was Used in the Fire. 13 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 13 
Page 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING LONG AND 
NELSON TO TESTIFY REGARDING "CANINE 
ACCELERANT DETECTIONS 15 
A. THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING CANINE 
ACCELERANT DETECTION CONSTITUTED NOVEL. 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EVIDENCE. IT WAS 
PRESENTED IN VIOLATION OF RIMMASCH. 18 
1. The State Failed to Establish the First Factor Set 
Forth in Rimmasch: that the Techniques Underlying 
Long's and Nelson's Testimony in this Case Were 
"Inherently Reliable." 21 
(a) The state failed to demonstrate the 
correctness of the techniques at issue. 23 
(b) The state failed to show that canine 
accelerant detection is accurate, reliable. 24 
(c) There is no evidence concerning the 
"qualifications of those'1 who "actually 
gathered the data and analyzed it." 26 
2. The State Failed to Present Evidence to Support 
that the Dog, Oscar, Had Any Measurable Success 
Rate with Respect to Detecting Accelerant. 30 
3. The Evidence Concerning Canine Accelerant 
Detection Was Confusing and Conflicting. It Lacked 




4. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion. Based on 
the Paucity of Evidence on the Matter, a Mindful Judge 
Would Have Excluded Evidence Relating to Canine 
Accelerant Detection. 36 
B. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL 
REQUIRING REVERSAL. 38 
CONCLUSION 44 
Addendum A: Judgment 
Addendum B: Utah R. Evid. 702 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 
2001 UT 77, 31 P.3d 557 21, 22, 30 
Campbell v. State Farm Insurance Co.. 2001 UT 89, 
432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 33, 38 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) 18, 19 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Foote. 14 S.W.3d 512 
(Ark. 2000) 18, 19, 22, 37 
Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999 UT 61, 987 P.2d 22 20-23, 25, 26, 29 
Green v. Louder. 2001 UT 62, 29 P.3d 638 19 
Iselv v. Capuchin Province. 877 F.Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995) 23 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 526 U.S. 137 (1997) 20 
Pack v. Case. 2001 UT App 232, 30 P.3d 436 28 
Patev v. Lainhart. 1999 UT 31 29,31,40 
People v. Acri. 662 N.E.2d 115 (111. 1996) 19, 22, 37 
Phillips v. Jackson. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) 36 
State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42, 5 P.3d 642 19 
State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986) 44 
iv 
Page 
State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997) 21, 30, 31, 35 
State v. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59 2, 20-22 
State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 43 
State v. Clayton. 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982) 29 
State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996) 14, 18, 20, 21, 28, 
30,33,35,36 
State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 2 
State v. Kellev. 2000 UT 41, 1 P.3d 546 19, 28, 29, 31 
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) 33 
State v. McCovey. 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990) 2 
State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 1115 14, 20, 33 
State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989) 38 
State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) 1, 14, 18-23, 27, 28, 
30-33, 36, 38, 39 
State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) 44 
U.S. v. Murray. 784 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1986) 35 
U.S. v. Williams. 69 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995) 19 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-21 (1998) 19 
v 
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b) and (3)(b) (1999) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) 1 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (2001) 20, 33 
Utah R. Evid. 702 (2001) 2, 18, 20, 31, 33 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
NFPA921 Guide for Fire and Explosion 
Investigations (2001 ed.) 10,40 
Webster's New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 1999) 
251 18 
Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence 
Law 7-9 (996) 33 
vi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
TROY LYNN SCHULTZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: CaseNo.20010775-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), where the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree or 
capital felony offense. In the underlying case to this matter, Appellant Troy Schultz was 
convicted of arson, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b) 
and (3)(b) (1999). A copy of the judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the trial court erred in 
allowing the state to admit testimony into evidence concerning the use of a dog to detect 
accelerant at the scene of the fire, where such testimony lacked foundation and was in 
violation of State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). 
Standard of Review: "Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony, '"and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.'"" State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, [^28, 27 P.3d 1133 (cites 
omitted). See also State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (in reviewing 
a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence, this Court will examine "(1) 
whether the trial court selected the correct rule of evidence, (2) whether the trial court 
correctly interpreted that rule, and (3) whether the trial court correctly applied the rule"). 
An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial judge has failed to comply with the 
law. See State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990). In addition, if "no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court," the trial court's 
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^ [28 (cite omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue is preserved in the record on appeal at 206:3-7, and 207:148-151. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision will be determinative of the issue on appeal: Utah Rules 
of Evidence 702 (2001). The text of that provision is contained in Addendum B hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On August 9, 2000, the state filed charges against Schultz for aggravated arson, 
arson, and aggravated assault. (R. 5-7.) The charge for aggravated arson was dismissed 
(R. 5, 48), and the state proceeded with the matter to trial on the remaining charges for 
arson and aggravated assault. 
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On May 16, 2001, the court commenced a two-day jury trial in the matter. (R. 89-
91, 206, 207.) At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Schultz guilty of arson, and not 
guilty of aggravated assault. (R. 134, 135.) Schultz is appealing from the entry of final 
judgment in this case. (SeeR. 178-80, 185-86.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state presented testimony at trial from civilians, police officers who responded 
to the scene of a van fire, and "experts." Schultz has divided the Statement of Facts into 
those three categories. The state's evidence at trial was as follows. 
A. CIVILIANS DID NOT WITNESS SCHULTZ OR ANY PERSON SET THE 
VAN ON FIRE. 
The "Mr. Cineloa" Restaurant was located on Main Street in Salt Lake City, in an 
L-shaped building along with two bars and Gene's Barber Shop. Mr. Cineloa and the two 
bars were on the west side of Main Street with the barber shop around the corner, facing 
north on the short end of the L-shaped building. (R. 206:29-32.) 
On August 6, 2000, shortly after 3:00 p.m., Teresa Villegas drove to the restaurant 
in a van to pick up her husband, Roberto Espinoza. (R. 206:20.) Villegas parked the van 
in a lot behind the restaurant and left her two sons there to watch a television inside the 
van. (R. 206:21-22; 206:36.) Villegas entered the Mr. Cineloa restaurant with her 
daughters and met with her husband. (R. 206:21; 206:35.) 
Espinoza testified that 15 to 30 minutes after his wife arrived, they were alerted to 
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a fire. (R. 206:22, 29; 206:36.) They rushed outside and observed smoke and flames 
coming from their van. (Id, at 23, 36.) The van, valued between $1,000 and $5,000, was 
a total loss. (Id, at 24-25.) The boys were safe, outside playing. (Id, at 25, 36.) 
During the fire, Espinoza and Villegas observed a man on the roof of the L-shaped 
building. (R. 206:37.) They were not able to identify him. (R. 206:25-26; 206:38.) 
Meanwhile, from an apartment on the other side of Main Street, John Pavelchak 
was watching television with a friend. His attention was diverted to three individuals in 
front of Willey's Bar engaged in a fight.1 The individuals were "yelling and screaming" 
at each other and he observed the men in "fisticuffs." (R. 206:43-45; 206:62.) After the 
altercation ended, two of the individuals went inside the bar, while the third remained 
outside. (Id, at 46.) The third individual looked around on the ground near the parking lot 
area, then he ran across the street and looked on the ground below the apartment where 
Pavelchak was observing the matter. (See id. at 46-47, 65.) The individual disappeared 
from view for a while. (See id, at 66.) 
Pavelchak testified that while the individual was searching the ground, he 
murmured something like, "I'm going to get you guys." (R. 206:46-48.) 
Later, Pavelchak saw the man on top of the roof of the L-shaped building "trying 
to put - it looked like a cloth into a ventilation duct." (R. 206:52.) Pavelchak was unsure 
1 Willey's Bar is located in the L-shaped building. 
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about that observation, and he could not say whether the man managed to put the "cloth" 
in the "vent." (R. 206:52-53.) Pavelchak also observed "a huge plume of black smoke" 
across the street in the area of the bar. (R. 206:48.) 
Pavelchak ran to the bar and warned patrons inside that it was on fire. (R. 206:49; 
id. at 67.) When Pavelchak came out of the bar, he realized the smoke was coming from 
behind the building. Pavelchak then noticed a man on the roof looking down at him. (See 
id. at 50, 68.) The man disappeared from view until Pavelchak rounded the building and 
observed the man jump from the roof. (Id. at 50.) The man ran north on Main Street with 
Pavelchak chasing him. (Id, at 51, 69.) Pavelchak and the man ran for half a block, then 
turned into a driveway (id. at 54, 69) and between two houses to a parking lot. There the 
man stopped and faced Pavelchak with a knife in his hand. (Id. at 55, 70-71.) Pavelchak 
knocked the knife to the ground and ripped the man's shirt. (kL at 58.) The man took off 
again and climbed over a fence, beyond Pavelchak's reach. (Id. at 71-72.) Pavelchak 
identified the man as the defendant, Troy Schultz. (Id. at 59-60.) 
Next, Lori Stapley testified. She stated that on August 6, she drove toward Main 
Street up 1700 South with her daughter, Charli. They observed the van smoking. (R. 
206:78; 206: 87.) They also observed a man standing by the van. (R. 206:81.) Accor-
ding to Charli, the man was throwing "a rag or a white napkin into the van." (R. 206:87, 
91.) Stapley and her daughter saw the man run up Main Street. (R. 206:82-83; 206:88.) 
At trial, both Stapley and Charli provided a general description of the man, and 
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they testified that the week before trial, officers presented a picture to them of the 
defendant in a police car. The officers asked if the person in the picture resembled the 
person Stapley and her daughter saw by the van on August 6. (R. 206:79-80; 206:89-90.) 
Stapley testified at trial that the picture of Schultz was "quite a bit like the gentleman" she 
saw by the van, and Charli could not say for sure whether the man in the picture was the 
person she observed by the van. (R. 206:79-80; 206:90, 94.) 
The state also called Patrick Crofoot to testify at trial. According to Crofoot, he 
was at his brother's house two blocks from the scene when he observed a plume of black 
smoke in the direction of Main Street and 1700 South. (R. 206:96-97.) Crofoot rode to 
the scene on his motorcycle, saw defendant on the roof of the businesses (id. at 108-09), 
and ultimately joined on his motorcycle in the chase after defendant. Crofoot continued 
the chase on foot over a fence until defendant ran out of Crofoot's reach. (Id at 98-99.) 
Crofoot returned to his motorcycle and rode up and down the streets until he saw the 
defendant in handcuffs with officers. (Id. at 100.) Crofoot spoke with an officer about 
the fire, when Schultz interrupted to say "something about he didn't mean to ['catch the 
van on fire/] it was an accident." (id. at 101-02.) Crofoot identified Schultz as the 
person he chased and as the person who made the statements on August 6. (Id. at 102.) 
B. THE OFFICERS PROVIDED TESTIMONY ABOUT THEIR 
OBSERVATIONS. 
After the civilians testified, the state called two officers to the witness stand. 
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Officer Lisa Pascaldo arrested Schultz. She testified that after the arrest (see R. 206:119-
20), an individual came up to her on a motorcycle and talked to her "about what was 
happening." (R.206:120.) During the conversation, Schultz spontaneously said, "I didn't 
mean to do it. I didn't mean to hurt anybody." (R. 206:121.) 
Next, Officer Shanelle Boyd testified that she was at the fire scene to direct traffic. 
While she was on the scene, Pavelchak handed a shirt and pocketknife to her that he had 
taken from the defendant during the chase. (R. 207:180-81.) 
C. THE "EXPERTS" TESTIFIED TO THE USE OF A FIRE "ACCELERANT" 
TO SUPPORT "INTENT" TO COMMIT ARSON. 
The state called three "experts" to testify: Jeffrey Long, Rex Nelson, and Jennifer 
McNair. They testified to the alleged use in this case of a fire accelerant. 
1. Jeffrey Long's "Expert" Testimony Concerning the Use of Dogs in Detecting 
Fire Accelerant Was Based in Relevant Part on Articles He Read. 
Long testified to his qualifications as an investigator, where he had taken classes, 
and participated and certified in fire investigation courses and techniques. (R. 207:132-
33.) Long also served in various positions of authority and he served on a committee for 
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which published a manual setting forth 
guidelines, standards and codes for "worldwide" fire investigation. (IdL at 133-34.) 
Long explained the process for determining the "origin and cause of a fire (R. 
207:135-137), and he described how an accelerant may be used to start and/or escalate a 
fire. (Id. at 138.) According to Long, when investigating a fire, he assesses whether the 
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"fuel load" or the area feeding the fire is "normally supposed to burn" fast. (Id at 139.) 
Long testified that a vehicle has a "lot of fuel load," including plastics, wiring, 
polyurethane foam, and carpet, all of which burn quickly. (IdL at 139.) 
Long described the use of "an accelerant detection canine" in fire investigations, 
and he testified that the county fire department used two such dogs in their investigations. 
(R. 207:142-43.) Long identified a book described as the 2001 edition of the NFPA921, 
and he testified that "Dr. DeHann" developed those portions of the book concerning 
"canine teams." (IcL at 143.) Long testified that DeHann was a "true expert" in the field 
and he identified an additional manual and an article written by DeHann. (Id. at 144.) 
Long made references to the 2001 edition of the NFPA921 and testified that 
"scientific method[s]" in the book were "based on studies." (R. 207:144-45.) Although 
Long did not participate in the studies, his committee for the NFPA apparently assessed 
whether the studies were relevant for publication in the book. (R. 207:144-45.) 
Long testified to his "thoughts" (see R. 207:145 (prosecutor specifically did not 
ask Long about "truths" but asked only about "general thoughts")) on "canines and their 
value to fire investigation." (R. 207:145.) According to Long, "the canine is just a tool," 
in that it is brought to a fire scene to see whether it will "alert" to areas where an 
accelerant may have been used. (R. 207:145.) If the dog alerts, fire officials will take a 
sample of the area and place it in a can for laboratory testing. (R. 207:146.) 
According to Long, a dog may alert to the use of an accelerant that is not detected 
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in laboratory testing. (R. 207:146-47.) Long also acknowledged that in certain situations 
the dog may give a "false positive" alert, meaning the dog may alert when no accelerant 
has been used. (R. 207:171.) 
Long's testimony concerning the use of dogs for accelerant detection was based on 
his review of articles (R. 207:149-50) concerning studies that "were actually" performed. 
(R. 207:150-51.) There is no indication that Long personally participated in or observed 
the actual studies. (See R. 207: 131-178, generally.) In addition, Long read from an 
article published in the NFPA921, which stated the following: 
[LONG]: . . . The [NFPA921 states that the] proper use of detection canines is to 
assist with the location of [the] selection of samples. In order for the presence or 
absence of an ignitable liquid to be scientifically confirmed in the sample, that 
sample should be analyzed by a laboratory in accordance with 14.5.3. Any canine 
alert not confirmed by laboratory analysis should not be considered validated. 
Research has shown that canines have responded or have been alerted to 
[pyrolysis products] - the word [pyrolysis] - may I explain that? 
THE COURT: You may. 
[LONG]: [inaudible] is actually burning of the [inaudible]. Okay, that's where the 
word pyromaniac, pyro [comes from]. [Canines have responded to pyrolysis 
products that are not produced by an ignitable liquid and] have not always 
responded when ignitable liquid accelerant was known to be present. If the 
investigator feels that there [were] indicators of an accelerant, samples should be 
taken even in the absence of canine alert. 
The canine olfactory system is believed to be capable of detecting gasoline 
in concentration below those normally cited for [laboratory] methods. The 
detection limit, however, is not the sole criteria for even the most important for any 
forensic technique. Scientifically - or specifically the ability to distinguish 
between ignitable liquids and background materials is even more important than 
sensitivity for detection of any ignitable liquid residue. 
Unlike explosives or drug[] detecting dogs, these canines are trained to 
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detect substances that are common to our everyday environment. 
The techniques exists today for forensic laboratories to detect sub-micro liter 
quantities of ignitable liquids, but because these substances are intrinsic to our me-
chanized world, [merely] detecting such quantities is of limited evidential value. 
Current research does not indicate which individual chemical compound or 
classes of chemical compounds are key triggers for canine alert. Research reveals 
that most classes of compound contain ignitable liquid [that] may be produced 
from the burning of common synthetic materials. That would be your foam in the 
couch. Laboratories that use ASTM guidelines have minimum standards that 
define most chemical compounds that must be present in order to make a positive 
determination. The sheer variety of [pyrolysis] products present in a fire scene 
suggest possible reason for some unconfirmed alerts by canines. The 
discriminatory ability of a canine is to distinguish between pyrolysis products and 
ignitable liquids is remarkable but not [infallible]. 
(R. 207:152-54); NFPA921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Invest. (2001 ed.) §14.5.3.5. 
Long testified that an accelerant detection dog was used at the scene of the fire in 
this case. It "alerted" to two areas in the van: an area behind a passenger seat and an area 
to the left of the first alert. (R. 207:156-57.) Long collected samples from the areas and 
submitted them to the State Crime Laboratory for testing. (R. 207:159, 165.) 
On cross-examination, Long acknowledged that according to early literature, 
trained dogs make accurate alerts between 50 and 82 percent of the time. (R. 207:171.) 
In addition, Long acknowledged that authorities "hop[ed],f "canines could pass with a 75 
percent accuracy rate" in accelerant detection. (R. 207:172.) 
Long provided an opinion as to the "point of origin" of the fire in this case, and the 
cause of the fire. He stated the fire started in the area where the dog "alerted." (R. 
207:165, 163.) Long also testified that the fire was "intentionally set. It was arson -
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incendiary." (R. 207:202.) Long testified that "burn patterns on the carpet" were too 
irregular for the fire to be "anything other than an ignitable liquid," and the rate of 
acceleration — that is, "how fast the fire grew" - supported the use of flammable liquid in 
this case. (R. 207:202.) Long did not specifically describe the irregular "burn patterns" 
on the carpet or indicate how "fast" the fire grew. (R. 207:155-68; see 206:29 (the van 
may have been unoccupied for 15 to 30 minutes).) Long also admitted that he relied on 
Oscar to identify the point of origin. (R. 207:155-56; 207:163.) 
2. Rex Nelson Testified to the Use of His Detection Dog, Oscar, at the Scene. 
Rex Nelson testified that he works for the Salt Lake County Fire Department and 
is the handler for the "accelerant detection dog," Oscar. (R. 207:184.) Oscar was trained 
over several weeks in a program in Virginia to alert on "about eight or nine different 
odors," and according to Nelson, Oscar's training continues daily. (R. 207:185-86, 191-
94.) Nelson testified that Oscar graduated from the Virginia program and he received a 
diploma less than 2 months prior to the events in this case. (R. 207:186-87, 192.) Nelson 
described Oscar's detection process as follows: 
Oscar is trained to sniff, he'll hit the accelerant, he'll sit and he'll stay until 
he's fed. I put pressure on his leash to make sure it's not a false positive, one of 
the tests that we use. He sits, he gets fed, gets rewarded, he gets - I'm giving him 
the seek command to show me, he'll put his nose right on the spot that he's 
alerting to, he gets fed again. So he'll get fed twice at every spot. 
(R. 207:187.) 
Nelson testified that on August 6, he and Oscar were called to the van fire on Main 
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Street. In accordance with the process described above, Oscar made two alerts in the 
van. (R. 207:188.) Nelson then ran a "discrimination line" with Oscar as follows: 
Typically what we do, we do the discrimination line. What a discrimination line 
does for us is it pretty much eliminates the possibility of [Oscar] making a false 
alert. What that means is we'll take a sample and by running it through a van or a 
fire scene whatever it might be[,] there are areas that he doesn't alert to in the [] 
burned products in the car. We'll take the two samples.. .we place them in one 
gallon cans, we place those outside the van. We take additional fire debris and 
place it with the samples. I run Oscar over all of the fire debris, it's called a 
discrimination line to see if he can discriminate between the products that he hit 
initially and the other destructors that we place there with the original hits. In this 
case, we placed them outside the van, I ran Oscar over the discrimination line, and 
he hit on the two suspect samples, but did not hit on the additional.. .fire debris 
that we had placed out there. 
(R. 207:189.) Nelson later took Oscar to the police station and presented items to him 
that belonged to Schultz. Oscar ''alerted" to Schultz's socks and shoes. (R. 207:190.) 
The state presented no evidence to support the accuracy of canine accelerant 
detection in controlled studies. (See R. 207:171 (early studies reported a 50 to 82 % 
accuracy rate for canine accelerant detection).) Likewise, the state presented no evidence 
concerning the success rate for dogs graduating from the Virginia program, and no 
evidence as to the success rate for Oscar in alerting for accelerant. (See record generally.) 
On cross-examination, counsel for the defense asked Nelson the following: "Oscar 
has made a mistake in that he had hit on something that he's not trained to hit on, 
correct?" Nelson was unable to answer that question: "I don't know the answer to that. 
Oscar has hit on items that have come back from the lab as no identifiable hydrocarbons. 
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It's possible, but we don't know." (R. 207:195.) 
3. The Expert from the State Crime Lab Could Not Confirm that Accelerant Was 
Used in the Fire. 
Jennifer McNair conducted laboratory tests at the State Crime Lab on the samples 
Long collected from the van, and on Schultz's socks and shoes. McNair testified that she 
did not detect "any ignitable liquid residue" on the samples from the van or on Schultz's 
socks. (R. 207:199.) According to McNair, that could mean that no flammable liquid 
was used in connection with the fire, or a liquid that evaporated quickly was used and not 
detected in laboratory testing. McNair could not provide any further information on the 
matter. (R. 207:200-01.) 
With respect to Schultz's shoes, McNair testified that she detected toluene, a 
solvent that is flammable and used to dissolve paints or plastics. She also testified that 
toluene is used in glue for shoes. (R. 207:199-200.) McNair opined that the toluene she 
discovered "came from the glue on the shoes" and not from a source independent from 
the shoes and related to the fire. (R. 207:200.) 
After the state presented its evidence, the jury convicted Schultz of arson. Schultz 
is appealing from the final judgment in the matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Over the objections of the defense, the state's expert witnesses, Jeffrey Long and 
Rex Nelson, were allowed to present novel, scientific and technical evidence at trial. 
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Specifically, they testified that Oscar the dog detected fire accelerant in the van. The 
testimony relating to Oscar allegedly served to support the state's claim that the fire was 
intentionally set. The evidence was inadmissible under Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, State v. 
Crosby. 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), and the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Pursuant to Utah law the proponent of novel, scientific or technical evidence must 
prove the following: (l)f,the scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's 
testimony are inherently reliable," Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641, (2)"the scientific principles or 
techniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by suf-
ficiently qualified experts," kL (note and cites omitted), and (3) the scientific or technical 
evidence at issue is more probative than prejudicial. Id.; see also State v. Mead. 2001 UT 
58, TJ40, 27 P.3d 1115; Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388. 
In this case, the state failed to establish each of the factors identified above as they 
related to canine accelerant detection. First, the state's witnesses failed to make a 
foundational showing under the "inherent reliability" prong. Among other things, the 
state did not provide any evidence concerning the reliability of the scientific techniques at 
issue, or the ability — through use of reliable methods — to ascertain whether a dog has 
provided an accurate alert or a "false positive" alert for ignitable liquid. The lack of 
information placed the validity of the techniques in question. On cross-examination, the 
state's experts admitted that early studies showed the success rate for "canine accelerant 
detection" was as low as 50 percent, thereby supporting the determination that the 
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scientific methods and techniques at issue were not reliable. 
Where the record failed to support inherent reliability, the evidence concerning 
canine accelerant detection lacked foundation and was inadmissible. 
Second, the experts failed to establish that Oscar the dog had any measurable or 
known success rate in allegedly detecting accelerant. Indeed, the state's witnesses were 
unable to say whether Oscar could accurately detect accelerant. 
Third, the evidence offered through Jeffrey Long and Rex Nelson was more 
prejudicial than probative. It likely confused jurors and gave them the false impression 
that they could rely on evidence of canine accelerant detection. 
Finally, the inadmissible evidence prejudiced Schultz and denied him the right to a 
fair trial. In this case the officers should not have been allowed to testify to "canine acce-
lerant detection," and they should not have been allowed to bring Oscar into the court-
room so that jurors could observe that he was obedient during testimony on the matter. 
For the reasons more fully set forth below, Schultz is entitled to a new trial without the 
"expert" testimony from Long and Nelson concerning "canine accelerant detection." 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING LONG AND NELSON TO 
TESTIFY REGARDING "CANINE ACCELERANT DETECTION.1 
The state presented the theory at trial that Oscar the dog alerted to the use of 
flammable liquids at the scene of a fire. (R. 207:163, 165; 207:185-89.) Both Jeffrey 
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Long and Rex Nelson testified to the general use of dogs in detecting fire accelerant and 
to the events of August 6. Long testified that when he investigated the van fire, he 
engaged in his routine investigative techniques. However, based on those techniques, he 
was unable to ascertain the origin of the fire. Long stated the following: 
[LONG]: In that vehicle it showed that there was fire in the [inaudible] of the van, 
with the V pattern going up from it. The vehicle side door was open, which was 
consistent with what the owner said, plus also the firefighters' efforts and the 
windows had been blown out by the fire. So I started the area of origin from both 
the back of the vehicle and worked towards the center. 
[PROSECUTOR]: And did you find a point of origin? 
[LONG]: At that time, no I did not. I saw some unusual burn patterns in the van. 
I also - based on what I had seen on other vehicle fires from the time the fire 
burned, the fire burned too fast for - had too much damage for the amount of time 
it was not being occupied, so at that time I contacted investigator Rex Nelson to 
bring in a canine [inaudible]. 
(R. 207:155-56.) According to Long, Rex Nelson arrived with Oscar the dog. When 
Nelson and Oscar investigated the scene, Oscar "made two alerts," one behind the passen-
ger's seat and one behind the driver's seat in the van. (R. 207:156-57.) Based on those 
alerts, Long was able to make other observations to formulate an opinion as to the origin 
and the cause of the fire. Long observed a V pattern and he observed the collapsed roof 
below where Oscar alerted. Long also observed "irregular burn patterns" (R. 207:163). 
Long testified that in his opinion the fire originated in the area where the dog 
alerted for accelerant (R. 207:163-65). He also provided his opinion as it related to the 
cause of fire: "I determined that the fire was intentionally set. It was arson - incendiary." 
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(R. 207:202.) His opinion concerning the cause also focused on accelerant. 
Significantly, Long admitted that before Nelson brought Oscar to the scene, Long 
was unable to ascertain the origin and cause of the fire. (R. 207:155-56.) Long also 
testified that in his opinion, he could not "think of any one tool that has been as good as 
the canine" in fire investigations. (R. 207:145.) 
Long's testimony purportedly provided a foundation for Nelson's testimony 
concerning Oscar. Nelson testified that Oscar was trained to detect accelerant, and in this 
case, he alerted to accelerant in two places in the van, and he alerted to socks and shoes 
belonging to Schultz. (R. 207:185-86, 188-90.) 
The state used the evidence concerning Oscar to bolster Long's opinion that the 
fire was intentionally set, and to support that Schultz started the fire. (See R. 207:155-56 
(Long used Oscar to identify origin); 207:190 (Oscar alerted to Shultz's clothing).) 
Yet, additional evidence presented at trial supported that canine accelerant 
detection is unreliable. Long admitted that under fire investigation standards, if 
independent laboratory testing cannot confirm the use of an accelerant where a dog has 
alerted, the alert is invalid. (R. 207:152.) In this case, a technician testified that scientific 
laboratory testing could not confirm accelerant where Oscar alerted. (R. 207:197-200.) 
Thus, Oscar's alerts were invalid. In addition, Long admitted that according to early 
studies, dogs accurately alerted 50 to 82% of the time. That is insufficient. 
Long's testimony concerning canine accelerant detection lacked foundation, 
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reliability, and probative value under Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 
and the Utah Rules of Evidence. Nelson's testimony was irrelevant, baseless, and 
prejudicial. The trial court erred in allowing the state to present evidence of canine 
accelerant detection in this case. Schultz is entitled to a new trial. 
A. THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING CANINE ACCELERANT DETECTION 
CONSTITUTED NOVEL. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EVIDENCE. IT 
WAS PRESENTED IN VIOLATION OF RIMMASCH. 
Pursuant to Utah law, expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, which provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
"[Science] represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations 
about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement." Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). Scientific evidence consists of the 
ability to identify a particular chemical or liquid. Chemicals may be detected and 
identified through laboratory testing with proper application of scientific techniques and 
principles. See Webster's New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 1999) 251 (defining 
"chemistry" as a science dealing with the composition and properties of a substance). 
The ability to detect the use of an accelerant at the scene of a fire involves the use 
of scientific methods or techniques. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 
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512, 519-20 (Ark. 2000) (applying Daubert-type analysis to testimony concerning canine 
accelerant detection); People v. Acrl 662 N.E.2d 115 (111. App. 1996) (applying analysis 
for scientific expert testimony to evidence concerning canine accelerant detection). 
In this case, the state presented evidence that a dog may be able to detect ignitable 
liquids used to start or escalate a fire. Utah courts have not analyzed the use of such 
evidence at trial.2 In that regard, "canine accelerant detection" is a new or novel science. 
See Farm Bureau Mutual Ins., 14 S.W.3d at 519-20 (finding evidence of canine 
accelerant detection to be inadmissible); Acn, 662 N.E.2d at 117 (same). 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that if a party is presenting evidence of novel 
scientific or technical principles, that party must satisfy the three-part test set forth in 
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388. See State v. Kelley. 2000 UT 41, [^19, 1 P.3d 546; State v. 
Adams. 2000 UT 42,1J16, 5 P.3d 642 (Rimmasch is implicated "when the expert 
testimony is 'based on newly discovered principles5"); see also Green v. Louder. 2001 UT 
2 While a dog is commonly used to sniff for illegal drugs, courts have considered the 
relevance of such evidence as it relates to "probable cause" to search. See e.g. U.S. v. 
Williams. 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995) (canine inspection for narcotics supported 
probable cause). The state's burden of proof in establishing probable cause to search is 
lower then the state's burden of proof at trial. 
Schultz was unable to find any case in this jurisdiction where the state was allowed 
to present evidence of a dog sniff at trial to establish that a substance constituted an illegal 
drug. Indeed, the state generally is required to produce laboratory results to establish that 
fact. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-21 (1998) (requiring standards for interpretation of 
chemical and forensic analysis in determining a controlled substance). 
Likewise, Schultz was unable to locate any case in this jurisdiction where the state 
was allowed to present evidence at trial of a dog alert for flammable liquid. 
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62, j^27, 29 P.3d 638; Butterfield. 2001 UT 59, ^ 29 fRimmasch sets forth a "three-part 
standard for admitting scientific or technical evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 
702"); Kumho Tire Co. v. CarmichaeL 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1997) (holding that trial 
court's gatekeeping responsibility extends to all expert testimony). 
The three-part test requires the proponent of the evidence to prove that (1) the 
scientific principles or techniques underlying the expert's testimony are "inherently 
reliable"; (2) a sufficiently qualified expert "properly applied" the inherently reliable 
scientific principles or techniques in this case; and (3) the scientific or technical evidence 
at issues is more probative than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641; Mead. 2001 UT 58,140. 
The Utah Supreme Court has specified that its opinion in "Rimmasch provides a 
detailed and rigorous outline for trial courts to follow when making determinations 
concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence." Crosby. 927 P.2d at 642. In 
considering the admissibility of scientific or technical evidence, a trial judge "is charged 
with the responsibility of being a 'gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize [the] proffered 
evidence.'" Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999 UT 61, Tfl2, 987 P.2d 22; see also Kumho Tire. 
526 U.S. at 147 (trial court's gatekeeping responsibility extends to all expert testimony). 
The novelty of the evidence presented by Long and Nelson in this case required 
careful application of the Rimmasch factors. Since the state failed to establish a proper 
foundation, the trial court erred in admitting into evidence, Long's and Nelson's 
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testimony concerning canine accelerant detection, as further discussed below. 
1. The State Failed to Establish the First Factor Set Forth in Rimmasch: that the 
Techniques Underlying Long's and Nelson's Testimony in this Case Were 
"Inherently Reliable." 
"Rimmasch requires a threshold showing that the scientific principles and tech-
niques are inherently reliable.'" Butterfield 2001 UT 59, TJ29; State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 
337, 340 (Utah 1997) (the foundational showing must establish inherent reliability). The 
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that "evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a matter 
of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue' 
and, therefore, is inadmissible." Franklin, 1999 UT 61, f^ 13 (cite omitted). 
"Inherent reliability" may be established in one of two ways. First, it may be 
established through "judicial notice" if the "scientific principles and techniques at issue [] 
have been generally accepted by the 'relevant scientific community.'" Butterfield, 2001 
UT 59, T|29 (citing Brown. 948 P.2d at 340). Second, 
[i]f judicial notice is inappropriate, "the court must determine whether the party 
seeking to have the evidence admitted has sufficiently demonstrated the inherent 
reliability of the underlying principles and techniques." State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 
638, 641 (Utah 1996) (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 400). This foundational 
showing must explore "such questions as the correctness of the scientific principles 
underlying the testimony, the accuracy and reliability of the techniques utilized in 
applying the principles to the subject matter before the court and in reaching the 
conclusion expressed in the opinion, and the qualifications of those actually 
gathering the data and analyzing it.... In the absence of such a showing by the 
proponent of the evidence and a determination by the [trial] court as to its 
threshold reliability, the evidence is inadmissible." 
ButterfielcL 2001 UT 59,1J29 (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403); see also Brewer v. 
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Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 2001 UT 77,1J18, 31 P.3d 557. 
In this case, the state did not ask the trial court to take judicial notice of the inhe-
rent reliability of canine accelerant detection. (See record in general.) Indeed, there was 
no basis for taking judicial notice of the matter. The state did not present information to 
support that canine accelerant detection has been generally accepted in the scientific 
community or legal community. (See record in general.) 
In this matter, the trial court requested "foundation." (R. 206:3-7; 207:150.)3 To 
that end, under the first Rimmasch factor, the state was required to establish (a) "the 
correctness" of the scientific or technical principles underlying the testimony, (b) "the 
accuracy and reliability of the techniques utilized in applying the principles" and in 
reaching the conclusion expressed in the opinion, and (c) "the qualifications of those 
3 Although the trial court did not take judicial notice of "inherent reliability," this 
Court may do so under certain circumstances. On appeal, this Court may look to scien-
tific literature and the decisions of other courts to ascertain whether the technique at issue 
has gained a "very high level of reliability." If it has, it is appropriate on appeal to take 
judicial notice of reliability. See Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398; kLat 400; Butterfield, 2001 
UT 59, TJ33 n.5; Franklin. 1999 UT 61, [^14. Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court has 
refused to take judicial notice of inherent reliability where "there is no unanimity in the 
legal community as to the inherent reliability of the specific technique at issue. See 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 400-01 (recognizing reliability where all courts addressing the 
question have affirmed admissibility of the expert testimony). 
Considering the matter in this case, courts have refused to find that evidence of 
canine accelerant detection is admissible. The techniques are not reliable. Farm Bureau 
Mutual Ins., 14 S.W.3d at 519-20 (finding evidence inadmissible where rate of error was 
unknown); Acn, 662 N.E.2d at 117 (finding evidence inadmissible). In that regard, 
judicial notice would be improper. It would also be improper for the reasons more fully 
set forth in this brief. See infra subpoint A. 1., herein. 
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persons actually gathering the data and analyzing it." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403. The 
state failed to establish each prong of the reliability factor as explained below. On that 
basis alone, the trial court erred in admitting testimony into evidence relating to Oscar. 
(a) The state failed to demonstrate the correctness of the techniques at issue. 
A party seeking to admit evidence of a new scientific or technical method must 
establish the "correctness" of that method before testimony on the matter may be admitted 
at trial. Franklin, 1999 UT61,]fl3. 
[T]he proffered expert must be able to assure the Court that his/her theories have 
some degree of scientific validity and reliability. In particular, the witness should 
testify as to whether that theory can be, or has been, tested or corroborated and, if 
so, by whom and under what circumstances; whether the theory has been proven 
out or not proven out under clinical tests or some other accepted procedure for 
bearing it out; and whether the theory has been subjected to other types of peer re-
view. In establishing this, the expert must show that any underlying data and stu-
dies upon which he/she relies are of a type reasonably relied upon in his/her field. 
Franklin. 1999 UT 61,1J14 (quoting Iselv v. Capuchin Province, 877 F.Supp. 1055, 1064 
(E.D.Mich.1995)). 
In this case, Long testified that he had been employed with the Salt Lake County 
Fire Department for more than 27 years, he was promoted to the position of chief 
investigator in 1986, he was involved in training and certification in his field, and he 
served on a committee that published the NFPA921 setting forth standards and methods 
for fire investigation. (R. 207:132-34.) 
According to Long, before the committee may publish a new investigation method 
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or technique in the NFPA921, the method must undergo rigorous testing. (R. 207:144.) 
Long testified that the NFPA921 supported the use of dogs in detecting accelerant 
at the scene of a fire, and that the use of a dog for that purpose had been tested. (R. 
207:142-44.) Long did not provide any further information as it related to testing. 
The state failed to present evidence as to how canine accelerant detection was 
tested or under what circumstances; it failed to present evidence as to how testing was 
corroborated; it failed to present evidence to support that the theories concerning canine 
accelerant detection were proven out or not proven out in testing or under some accep-
table procedure; and it failed to present reliable evidence as to whether dogs were able to 
accurately alert to accelerant. In essence, there was no evidence concerning the 
correctness of the methods used. (R. 207:144-48.) Long's testimony left jurors with the 
impression that canine accelerant detection had been tested for accuracy. The testimony 
was insufficient. The state failed to establish the first part of the reliability analysis. 
(b) The state failed to show that canine accelerant detection is accurate, reliable. 
The state was required to prove that canine accelerant detection was accurate. In 
this case, Long simply testified, without elaboration, that canine detection had been tested 
and corroborated. He did not describe how it was tested. See supra subpoint A. 1 .(a). 
In addition, Long admitted at trial that according to early studies, the success rate 
for canine accelerant detection was 50 to 82%. (R. 207:171; see also 207:172 (experts 
hoped for a 75% success rate).) For a method that offers only two choices (alert vs. no 
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alert), a 50 percent success rate is insufficient. By any standard, those statistics represent 
guesswork. They do not provide any assurance that canine detection is valid or reliable. 
Long also admitted that when a dog alerts to an area for accelerant and the alert is 
not confirmed in laboratory testing, in his field the alert is considered to be invalid. (R. 
207:152.) 
In short, neither Long nor Nelson "could assure the trial court that the [] methods 
at issue had any degree of scientific validity or reliability." Franklin, 1999 UT 61, ^fl6. 
"[Njeither witness's testimony evokes confidence in the reliability of the scientific 
evidence." Id. Even if fire investigators fiercely supported the use of dogs to detect 
accelerant, that support does not translate into a belief or proof that such evidence is 
sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial. 
An important distinction exists between a tool that is relevant to fire investigation 
in determining that an accelerant has been used {i.e. laboratory testing), and a technique 
that presents questions about reliability. Since reliability cannot be established in the 
field of canine accelerant detection, it lacks evidentiary value at trial.4 
4 Imagine a detective who routinely relies on tips to solve his cases. If the detective in-
vestigates 20 tips relating to a neighborhood murder, some of which include a sympathe-
tic or emotional plea from scared area residents, and one of which leads to the suspect's 
arrest, should the detective be allowed to discuss at trial the tips that cannot be confirmed, 
but that add drama and sympathy to the investigation? The answer should be obvious. 
In this case, Long and Nelson testified to the use of a dog to detect accelerant. 
Oscar "alerted" to two areas in the van. (R. 201:156-57.) The dog's findings could not be 
confirmed in laboratory testing. (R. 207:197-200.) Nevertheless, Long relied in part on 
the dog's "alerts" to testify that, in his opinion, accelerant was used to start or escalate the 
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Although the trial court in this case accorded the state every opportunity to lay an 
adequate foundation as it related to the evidentiary value of canine accelerant detection 
and Oscar, the state was unable to do so. "In the end, the trial court should have found 
the evidence inadmissible, inasmuch as [the defendant] made a proper objection to its 
admission. Instead, by admitting the evidence, the trial court failed in its gatekeeping 
role." Franklin, 1999 UT 61, Tfl7. 
(c) There is no evidence concerning the "qualifications of those " who "actually 
gathered the data and analyzed it." 
Long provided testimony concerning his experience and training as a fire 
investigator. He testified that he had taken classes, he participated and certified in fire 
investigation courses and techniques, he served in various positions of authority, and he 
served on a committee for the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which 
fire. (See R. 207:145, 155, 160-65.) The concern with Long's and Nelson's testimony is 
that even if the dog was used as a tool by the fire investigators, since the dog's findings 
could not be confirmed, by industry standards the dog's alerts were invalid and irrelevant. 
(See R. 207:152.) If the dog's alerts were simply a step in the process, without adequate 
confirmation, that step should not have been discussed or admitted into evidence. 
In this case, the state did not treat canine accelerant detection as a simple step in 
the process. Indeed, the state presented 11 witnesses, two of which testified to canine 
accelerant detection. The testimony of Long and Nelson constituted almost half of the 
evidence at trial. In addition, Long testified that he was unable to determine an origin and 
cause of the fire based on his independent investigation of the scene. (R. 207:155.) 
Rather, he called Oscar to the scene and relied on Oscar's alerts. (R. 207:155-56.) Long 
stated that in his opinion, the dog was the best tool in the field. (R. 207:145.) 
The alerts provided the basis for Long's opinion testimony. The testimony in this 
case elevated the use of the dog over proven laboratory testing. Long should not have 
been allowed to testify to canine detection or to matters occurring after he was unable to 
ascertain a cause and origin based on his independent investigation. (See R. 207:155-56.) 
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published a manual setting forth guidelines, standards and codes for "worldwide" fire 
investigation. (R. 207:132-34.) 
Long also explained the process he used to determine the "origin and cause of a 
fire. (R. 207:135-137.) Long's testimony related to the techniques he employed in fire 
investigation. Next, Long testified that he was familiar with canine accelerant detection 
through his service on the NFPA committee and in developing guidelines for the 
publication. (R. 207:142-44.) Long reviewed studies relating to fire investigation 
techniques, including canine accelerant detection, and he assisted in publishing guidelines 
and methods based on those studies. (See id.; also 207:149-50.) 
There is no evidence in this case that Long ever participated in or actually 
observed studies relating to canine accelerant detection; there is no evidence that Long 
had any experience in handling dogs for accelerant detection or for any other purpose; 
and there is no evidence that Long "actually gathered] the data" (Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 
403) for the studies or analyzed it in connection with preparing the reports. (See record.) 
Indeed, according to Long, "Dr. DeHann" was the "true expert" on the matter. (R. 
207:144.) Dr. DeHann was not called to testify. In addition, the state failed to present 
any evidence ~ through Long or otherwise — concerning DeHann's qualifications to 
gather and analyze data for canine accelerant detection. The only evidence presented on 
the matter was that DeHann was a forensic chemist and had written articles. (R. 207:143-
44.) The state presented no information concerning DeHann's knowledge, skill, 
27 
experience, training, education, or work with dogs or fire investigations. (See R. 
207:143-50.) Likewise, the state failed to present evidence concerning the testing 
techniques employed by DeHann. The lack of information does not support reliability in 
the person who allegedly gathered the information or developed the techniques at issue. 
To be clear, Schultz is not challenging Long's qualifications as a fire investigator. 
See KeUey, 2000 UT 41, |^14 (a person may be qualified to testify as an expert by virtue 
of experience and training); see Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, ^ 35, 30 P.3d 436 (even 
if a person's qualifications extend beyond the specialized knowledge at issue, the person 
may testify to the issue; for example, a general building inspector may provide testimony 
about roofing). Indeed, Schultz's argument concerning "qualifications" goes to the 
"inherent reliability" factor set forth in Rimmasch. Rimniasch, 775 P.2d at 403. A 
proponent of scientific or technical evidence must establish the "qualifications" of the 
person who actually gathered the data at issue and analyzed it, if the proponent is 
presenting evidence of novel principles or techniques. Id. 
The "qualification" showing for "inherent reliability" goes to the scientific method 
or technique in issue. That is separate from the "qualification" showing that must be made 
under the second Rimmasch factor for a testifying expert. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641 
(step one requires proof that the technique is "inherently reliable," which entails proof 
that the person who gathered and analyzed data to support the technique was qualified; 
step two requires proof that the testifying expert is qualified to and did properly apply the 
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"inherently reliable" technique).5 
In this case, Schultz is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to 
the person who allegedly developed the techniques at issue. That is, Dr. DeHann was in-
volved in "actually gathering the data and analyzing it." Thus, evidence of his 
qualifications is relevant to establish the inherent reliability of the techniques at issue. 
Since the state relied on reports and articles written by DeHann to support Long's 
testimony, the state was required to present some evidence regarding DeHann's qualifica-
tions. It failed to do so. We are left with a "'dearth of empirical scientific evidence 
regarding the . . . reliability' of the [] techniques, with serious questions and doubts 
concerning the reliability of those self-same techniques." Franklin, 1999 UT 61, Tfl6. 
The experts did not "testify regarding any testing or corroboration of the techniques" Dr. 
DeHann employed. IdL The lack of evidence makes it impossible to assess whether 
DeHann's reports were prepared by a quack scientist or a respected authority in the field. 
The state failed to establish "inherent reliability." Long's testimony regarding 
5 Stated another way, Utah appellate courts do not require proof of "inherent reliability" 
if the principles at issue are well-established. See Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^ [19. 
Nevertheless, the proponent of evidence still must establish that the testifying expert is 
qualified through training, experience or education to testify to the matter at issue. See 
Patev v. Lainhart 1999 UT 31, ^15, 977 P.2d 1193; State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1982). Schultz is not claiming that the state failed to establish Long's qualifications as 
they related to fire investigation techniques. Rather, Schultz is claiming that the state 
failed to establish the reliability of canine accelerant detection, where it failed to present 
evidence concerning the qualifications of the person who developed the technique. 
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canine accelerant detection was irrelevant and inadmissible. Since Long's testimony pur-
portedly served as a foundation for Nelson's testimony, Nelson's testimony also was 
inadmissible under the "inherent reliability" prong. 
Nelson's testimony was inadmissible for additional reasons set forth below. 
2. The State Failed to Present Evidence to Support that the Dog, Oscar, Had Any 
Measurable Success Rate with Respect to Detecting Accelerant. 
"If the proponent of the scientific evidence in question satisfies the threshold 
requirement of inherent reliability—either by judicial notice or through a foundational 
showing-the trial court must then consider Rimmasch's second and third requirements." 
Brewer. 2001 UT 77, ^19 (citing Brown. 948 P.2d at 341; Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641). 
Rimmasch's second factor requires the trial court to determine whether the "scientific 
principles or techniques have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by 
qualified persons and that the testimony is founded on that work." Brewer, 2001 UT 77, 
If 19 (citing Brown, 948 P.2d at 341; Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 398 n.7). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, 
In practice, the foundational showing necessary to demonstrate the inherent 
reliability of a scientific principle or technique discussed in step one will overlap 
with the foundational showing necessary for the admission of scientific evidence 
in a particular case discussed in step two. We separate them, however, to 
emphasize the point that a foundational showing that a technique is inherently 
reliable does not necessarily imply that the technique was properly applied to the 
facts of the case by a qualified expert. 
Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641 n.2. 
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In essence, the second factor requires proof that the expert testifying in the matter 
is qualified and has applied the technique properly.6 In this case, the second factor is 
irrelevant. Without proof that "canine accelerant detection" is inherently reliable, it is 
not necessary to assess whether a qualified person properly applied the techniques; the 
evidence already may not be admitted at trial. See Brown, 948 P.2d at 342 (while confi-
dence in the expert's application is important, such evidence is irrelevant if the proponent 
has failed to explain how the expert's methods support "reliability" under Rule 702). 
In addition, the state failed in its burden of proof under the second factor. Here, 
Rex Nelson testified that Oscar the dog attended a program for several weeks in Virginia 
and he graduated with a diploma. (R. 207:186.) Nelson also testified that he used a 
particular technique with Oscar for training and accelerant detection (R. 207:185-89), 
and Nelson observed Oscar. Significantly, Nelson was unable to testify whether Oscar 
could correctly detect the use of an accelerant. (R. 207:195.) Thus, there was no way to 
assess whether the techniques were accurate, or specifically, whether the techniques were 
accurate as they related to Oscar in this case. 
6 In KeUey, 2000 UT 41, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that if a proponent is relying 
on a technique or method that has a proven track record in scientific and legal communi-
ties, the proponent is not required to establish the first factor — "inherent reliability" - as 
set forth in Rimmasch. See KeUey, 2000 UT 41, ^fl9. Nevertheless, the court will assess 
whether the proponent established the second and third factors. The proponent must 
show that the expert is qualified and has knowledge that can assist the jury in resolving 
issues. See KeUey, 2000 UT 41,1ffll2-l4; Patev. 1999 UT 31,1HJ17-18, 24 (while 
"inherent reliability" factor did not apply to testimony about endodontic treatment; court 
assessed expert's qualifications and whether he used proper techniques in treatment). 
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In addition, the state failed in this case to present evidence concerning Oscar's 
performance in the Virginia program, whether dogs in the program were required to meet 
a specific success rate before graduation, what Oscar's standing was in his class, or what 
Oscar's success rate in the program was, among other things. (R. 207 in general.) In that 
regard, in addition to the paucity of evidence to support that canine accelerant detection 
was reliable (supra subpoint A.I., herein), there was no evidence to support that Long or 
Nelson had any way to tell whether Oscar performed with any measurable amount of 
success in investigating for accelerant, either generally or in this case. 
Stated another way, without evidence to support that canine accelerant detection is 
inherently reliable (see supra subpoint A.I., herein), and without evidence concerning 
Oscar's success rate, there is no confidence in the technique in this case, and no confi-
dence in how it was applied. Likewise, there is no reason to believe that Oscar actually 
applied the "technique" and accurately detected accelerant. The relevant evidence on the 
matter supports that Oscar's alerts were invalid. (See R. 207:152 (alerts not confirmed in 
laboratory testing are invalid); 207:197-200 (Oscar's "alerts" to accelerant could not be 
confirmed).) In this case, the state failed to prove the second factor. 
3. The Evidence Concerning Canine Accelerant Detection Was Confusing and 
Conflicting. It Lacked Probative Value and Should Have Been Excluded at Trial. 
With regard to the third factor set forth in Rimmasch, the state was required to 
establish that the evidence relating to canine accelerant detection and Oscar was more 
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probative than prejudicial. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. 
In State v. Crosby, we described the third prong as "whether the proffered 
scientific evidence will be more probative than prejudicial as required by rule 
403." 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996). However, Crosby was not intended to alter 
rule 403 determinations in any way. Properly stated, the third prong of the rule 702 
admissibility test is whether the probative value of the proffered scientific 
evidence "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403 
(emphasis added). 
Mead, 2001 UT 58,1J40 n.6. Also, 
"[t]he question that must be posed prior to the admission of any expert evidence is 
whether, on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact." State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Helpfulness depends upon "whether the subject is within the knowledge or 
experience of the average individual." Id. However, "[i]t is not necessary that the 
subject of the testimony be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could not possibly 
understand it without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it a requirement that the 
subject be beyond the comprehension of each and every juror." Id "This 
'helpfulness standard' also implicates Rule 403 considerations, since if the 
evidence is confusing or unfairly prejudicial it will hinder rather than aid jury 
decision making." Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 
7-9 (1996) (clarifying that "Rule 403 is not being applied directly, so ... the 
question is 'helpfulness,' not whether the probative value is greatly outweighed by 
confusion or prejudice"); see also Larsen. 865 P.2d at 1363 n. 12; State v. 
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 398 n. 8 (Utah 1989). 
Campbell v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 2001 UT 89, Tf86, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44. 
Here the testimony presented through Long and Nelson, with Oscar sitting 
obediently in front of the jury, was unfairly prejudicial, confusing, misleading to the jury, 
and a waste of time. In sum, it consisted of the following: Long arrived at the scene of 
the fire. He engaged in an independent investigation. Based on that investigation, Long 
33 
identified "some unusual burn patterns." Long did not elaborate on the patterns. Long 
testified that based on his initial, independent investigation, he was unable to ascertain a 
point of origin, and consequently a cause for the fire. (See R. 207:155-56.) 
Thereafter, Long contacted Nelson and asked him to bring Oscar to the scene. (R. 
207:155-56.) When Oscar arrived, he alerted to two areas in the van and he later alerted 
to socks and shoes belonging to Schultz. 
During trial, Long admitted that in his field, canine alerts are deemed to be invalid 
if they cannot be confirmed in laboratory testing. (R. 207:152.) In this case, the canine 
alerts could not be confirmed in laboratory testing. (R. 207:197-200.) They were invalid. 
Nevertheless, Long testified that in his opinion, the canine is the best tool available 
to fire investigators. (R. 207:145.) Also, he relied on Oscar's alerts in forming his 
opinions in the matter. (See R. 207:145, 155-56, 159-65,201-02.) Based on Oscar's 
investigation of the scene, Long opined that the fire originated in the area where Oscar 
alerted, that an accelerant was used, and that the fire was intentionally set. (R. 207:163-
65; 207:201-02.) 
Nelson testified exclusively to the use of Oscar and to Oscar's alerts in two areas 
of the van and to his alerts to items of clothing belonging to Schultz. (R. 207:184-95.) 
Oscar sat obediently in front of the jury during Nelson's testimony. 
Evidence that officials used a dog was not probative, particularly where there was 
no ability to confirm the dog's findings through reliable scientific testing. That is, even if 
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the state's evidence concerning canine accelerant detection went only to the use of Oscar 
as a tool in the investigation, the evidence was irrelevant and lacked probative value. It 
was improper for the state to discuss the use of the dog. 
To further illustrate the matter, the state's evidence concerning the dog may be 
compared to evidence of the polygraph test, a tool that has not gained reliability in the 
legal community for evidentiary purposes. The polygraph test is an investigative tool that 
allows officials to obtain confessions or other information from a suspect. See Brown, 
948 P.2d at 340 (defendant submitted to polygraph test at the request of police). It may 
be considered an effective tool. Nevertheless, the polygraph may yield erroneous results. 
Courts have refused to admit evidence of a polygraph test at trial. See id at 342 and n.5; 
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 642-43. That is, a party may not disclose either that a polygraph test 
was used, or the results of such a test at trial. The information is irrelevant. See Brown, 
948 P.2d at 342 (ruling that polygraph evidence is inadmissible); see also U.S. v. Murray, 
784 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1986) (government is precluded at trial from mentioning the words 
"polygraph examination"). 
In this case, the state's emphasis and reliance on the inadmissible evidence was 
misleading and confusing. Since the alerts could not be confirmed, evidence of the alerts 
was not probative and did not assist the jury in resolving issues. Indeed, the state's 
emphasis on the evidence sent a message to the jury that Oscar's contributions were more 
significant and trustworthy than laboratory testing. (R. 207:145 (Long testified that the 
35 
canine was the best tool available in fire investigations).) Yet, even by industry 
standards, Oscar's alerts were invalid. (See R. 207:152.) 
In the end, reliable evidence relating to accelerant came from the lab technician. 
McNair testified that based on her scientific studies and tests, she could not confirm the 
use of an accelerant in the van fire or on Schultz's clothing. (R. 207:197-200.) 
The careful exploration that needed to be made in this case was disregarded in its 
entirety. "[W]e are convinced that trial courts sometimes admit 'scientific1 evidence 
without scrutinizing its foundation carefully." Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 399. 
The difficulty presented by the record in the instance case is that the trial court did 
not follow the approach dictated by [Phillips v. Jackson. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 
1980),] and the State made no real effort to lay a foundation that would permit a 
determination of reliability. 
Id. at 403. "The trial court admitted the evidence over objection, apparently on the errone-
ous assumption [that] the lack of foundation went to the weight, not to the admissibility of 
the evidence." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 407. "[I]t can be said that evidence not shown to 
be reliable cannot, as a matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue' and, therefore, is inadmissible." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 640 
(cites omitted). In this case, the evidence concerning Oscar was inadmissible. 
4. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion. Based on the Paucity of Evidence on 
the Matter, a Mindful Judge Would Have Excluded Evidence Relating to Canine 
Accelerant Detection. 
Evidence presented at trial in this case supported that a dog may accurately alert to 
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an accelerant 50 to 82% of the time. (R. 207:171.) Also, according to industry standards, 
if a canine alert cannot be confirmed in laboratory testing, it is invalid. (R. 207:152.) 
According to the evidence presented in this matter, although Oscar alerted to two 
areas in the van and to items of clothing belonging to Schultz, the Utah State Crime 
Laboratory test results were negative. (R. 207:197-200.) Also, neither Long nor Nelson 
could provide any information concerning Oscar's success rate in detecting accelerant. 
Based on those facts, a reasonable judge would have precluded the state from presenting 
evidence at trial concerning canine accelerant detection. See Acri, 662 N.E.2d at 117 
(dog alerted to the use of accelerant in a home fire, while laboratory analysis came back 
negative; since reliability could not be established, court ruled that evidence concerning 
canine accelerant detection was inadmissible); Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance, 14 S.W.3d 
at 519-20 (investigator's testimony was offered to explain why the dog made five alerts 
and the laboratory detected accelerant in two samples; the investigator's testimony was 
inadmissible where the proponent "failed to carry its burden of proof on the issue of 
reliability"). 
Indeed, any reasonable trial judge would have rejected the evidence as unreliable 
based simply on the studies showing a 50 to 82 % accuracy rating. (See R. 206:3-7.) For 
a method that offers only two choices - "alert" vs. "no alert" - the same success rate may 
be reached by flipping a coin as part of the investigation. That is insufficient. 
In this case, the trial judge not only allowed the state to discuss canine accelerant 
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detection, but also the experts' testimony comprised almost half the evidence presented 
by the state at trial. In addition, Oscar was allowed to sit in front of jurors in order that 
they could observe his professional, gentle and respectful demeanor. 
Further, Long was allowed to testify that he could not think of a better tool avai-
lable to investigators than a dog (compare R. 207:145, with 206:7 (prosecutor claimed the 
state would not present evidence to support that "a dog is better than" some unidentified 
tool in fire investigating)); and he based his opinion concerning the use of an accelerant 
and the origin and cause of the fire on Oscar's alerts. That was improper. The evidence 
lacked reliability and foundation, and it was presented in a way to discredit results from 
the state crime lab. 
The trial court abused its discretion and committed legal error in allowing Long 
and Nelson to testify to canine accelerant detection and in allowing Oscar to sit in front of 
the jury during trial. As set forth below, the trial court's error compels the entry of an 
order reversing the conviction in this case. 
B. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL REQUIRING 
REVERSAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court articulated the prejudice standard under Rimmasch as 
follows: "If, in the absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for defendant, we must reverse the conviction." Rimmasch, 775 
P.2d at 407; Campbell 2001 UT 89,184; State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 
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1989) (in assessing prejudice, this Court will consider the case absent the evidence that 
was wrongfully admitted). 
In Rimmasch, defendant's daughter, the victim of child sexual abuse, "described 
[during a trial] the alleged incident of sexual activity" for which defendant was charged. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 390. In addition, experts for the state testified that the daughter 
had been abused, and some of the experts expressed that defendant was the culprit. Id 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in allowing the expert 
testimony. Because the case "hinged on a determination of credibility," the court found 
that allowing the evidence constituted prejudicial error. Id. at 407. 
The court recognized that erroneous admissions are more critical in a jury trial, kL 
since the judge in a bench trial is able to distinguish between substantive and other types 
of evidence (i.e. impeachment, cumulative). The Rimmasch case was tried to the bench. 
Schultz's case went to a jury. Long and Nelson provided the only testimony that 
an accelerant was used in the fire. Long testified that he detected "unusual burn patterns" 
in his initial investigation, but he did not elaborate on the matter. (R. 207:154-55.) 
Long also indicated that the fire grew fast for the amount of time the van was not 
occupied. (R. 207:155-68.) However, Long did not elaborate on that alleged observation 
and he did not discuss how long he believed the van was unoccupied. (See 206:29 (the 
van may have been unoccupied for 15 to 30 minutes)). According to industry standards, 
the time line relating to a fire is important only if the investigator makes accurate 
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observations. See NFPA921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations (2001 ed.) §17.2 
(discussing time line for fire investigation, and specifying that "the value of a time line" is 
dependent upon the accuracy of the information used to develop the time line). 
Also, based on his initial investigation, Long was unable to ascertain a point of 
origin — and consequently a cause for the fire. (R. 207:155.) Thereafter, Long contacted 
Nelson and asked him to bring Oscar to the scene. (R. 207:155-56.) When Oscar arrived, 
he alerted to two areas in the van and he later alerted to socks and shoes belonging to 
Schultz. Based on Oscar's investigation, Long opined that the fire originated in the areas 
where the dog alerted, an accelerant was used in the fire, and it was intentionally set. (R. 
207:145, 155-56, 156-57, 159-60; 207:201-02.) 
Long's testimony concerning canine accelerant detection should not have been 
admitted in evidence at trial. In addition, his opinions concerning the origin and cause of 
the fire were inadmissible since they were based on Oscar's alerts. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a declaration on an ultimate issue in a case 
"is inadmissible 'where an expert witness has not testified to sufficient facts on which to 
base his opinion." Patey, 1999 UT 31, TJ23. "The expertise of the witness, his degree of 
familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his opinion and the 
facts adduced must be established." Patey, 1999 UT 31, «fl23 (cites omitted). 
In this case, since Oscar's alerts were invalid and inadmissible, the state lacked 
sufficient facts in evidence to support Long's opinion testimony. Where the grounds for 
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Long's opinion testimony were erroneous, the opinions were erroneous. Also, since 
Nelson's testimony related entirely to canine accelerant detection, it was inadmissible. 
With respect to the remaining evidence in the case, it was circumstantial, 
conflicting and inconsistent. Without the state's evidence that an accelerant was used to 
start or escalate the fire, the jury likely would have concluded that the fire was an 
accident. Likewise, without the state's evidence that Oscar detected accelerant on items 
of clothing belonging to Schultz, the jury would have concluded that the state had no 
evidence directly linking Schultz to the fire. 
Additional evidence presented at trial supported that Schultz was observed on the 
roof of the L-shaped building (R. 206:49-50, 51-53, 59-60 (Pavelchak observed Schultz 
on the building); R. 206:25-26, 37-38 (testimony of Espinoza and Villegas)), and a person 
possibly matching Schultz's description was observed in the area of the van. (See R. 
206:79-80; 206:90,94 (testimony of Stapley and Charli).) Significantly, no witness 
observed how the fire started or who started it. 
Also, Pavelchak testified that he heard Schultz mumble that he would "get [those] 
guys" involved in an altercation with him. (R. 206:47.) That evidence does not support 
intentional arson, since such threats are often expressed in anger or frustration without 
ramification. Further, there is no evidence connecting the mumbled words to the van fire. 
(See record in general.) Pavelchak's testimony left unanswered questions that the jury 
may have resolved based on the evidence from Long that an accelerant was used to start 
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the fire. For example, Pavelchak did not observe Schultz start the fire. In addition, he did 
not have any information as to how the fire began. If the jury had not been exposed to the 
improper evidence, it may have concluded that Pavelchak's testimony did not shed light 
on the matter. 
Next, Crofoot and Pascaldo testified that Schultz made spontaneous statements 
when he was in custody. Crofoot and Pascaldo had conflicting recollections about the 
statements. If jurors believed Pascaldo, Schultz stated that he did not mean to hurt 
anyone. (R. 206:121.) That statement can be explained as follows: earlier, witnesses 
observed Schultz in an altercation with two men outside a bar. The altercation involved 
fisticuffs. (R. 206:45.) Schultz's statement likely related to an injury that he believed he 
may have caused to a person involved in the altercation. 
Lastly, McNair presented testimony in this case on the use of accelerant. She 
testified that clothing belonging to Schultz and samples from the van tested negative for 
ignitable liquid. If that admissible testimony had been the only evidence on the matter, 
the jury likely would have concluded that no accelerant was used to start the fire. The 
jury likely would have concluded that the state failed to establish "intent." (See e.g. R. 
207:201-02 (Long testified that he believed the fire was intentional because he believed 
accelerant was used in the fire).)7 
7 Even if Long based his opinion testimony on his independent investigation, Schultz is 
still prejudiced by the admission of the improper evidence in this case. (Continued . ..) 
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Absent the evidence relating to canine accelerant detection, the state's case 
consisted only of testimony from witnesses who saw a person by the van, witnesses who 
testified that Schultz was on top of the L-shaped building, and witnesses who chased 
Schultz even though they did not witness any wrongdoing on his part. The testimony 
required the jury to make certain leaps across gaps in the evidence. There is a reasonable 
likelihood that if the jury had not been mislead by the evidence concerning canine 
accelerant detection, the jury would have reached a result more favorable to Schultz. 
In other contexts, Utah appellate courts have refused to find "harmless" error 
where the evidence on a critical issue is circumstantial, or where the jury was required to 
resolve conflicts in the evidence. State v. Bvrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); 
By way of explanation, assuming arguendo the jury had not been exposed to 
evidence concerning canine accelerant detection, the jury would have been required to 
resolve conflicts between Long's testimony that an accelerant was used, and McNair's 
testimony that laboratory test results did not confirm the use of an accelerant. In that 
instance, jurors likely would have favored proven laboratory testing over human 
observations. 
Further, if the jury did not believe Long's testimony concerning the use of an 
accelerant, the jury likely would have discredited Long's testimony on other matters. For 
example, the jury may have questioned the motives behind Long's investigation. 
Specifically, in ruling out the possibility that the van fire was an accident, Long testified 
that he asked the van owner if he had problems with the van in the past. The van owner 
answered no. Long also checked the engine and dash for electrical problems, and he 
eliminated those areas as relevant to the investigation. Significantly, Long did not 
mention any investigation into the possibility that faulty wiring going to a TV in the van 
may have contributed to the fire, and he did not mention the possibility that the boys, who 
were last to occupy the van, had information regarding the matter. Thus, with Long's 
credibility in issue, the jury likely would have been inclined to question Long's motives 
in the investigation. 
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State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 
(Utah 1986) (when the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, 
court is less likely to find harmless error). 
In this case, the evidence was circumstantial and it required the jury to resolve 
conflicts and inconsistencies. The jurors may have been searching for some reason to 
believe the fire was intentionally set. The evidence concerning Oscar may have provided 
jurors with that reason. In addition, the jurors observed Oscar in court during the 
testimony. That likely caused them to sympathize with an obedient dog. In seeking to 
make some sense of the irrelevant, but highly emphasized information, the jurors may 
have been unduly influenced by Oscar's part in the investigation. The inadmissible 
evidence influenced the jurors' verdict in the matter, requiring reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant Troy Schultz respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this J ^day of o g L f o ^ ^ 2002. 
\AA\£foL 7l/( u 
LINDA M. JONES 
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Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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